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Abstract 
How does the knowledge of the medical student. clerk. intern. and registrar d~~clop and 
how do formal and informal. classroom and cxpcricntial learning contrihurc to this process’! 
Thcsc questions wcrc investigated in two cxporimcnts. focusing on knowludgc restructuring 
rnthcr than knc)wledgc acquisition. The expcrimcnts showed that practical cxpcricncc plays 
an nnpor~anr role in knowlcdgc rcstrucruring. l‘hc process was. however, not i)s continuouh 
as was cxpcctcd. Notilhly. advanced students appcurcd 10 h;lvc considcrablc knowlcdgc 
about conditions in paticn& and their cnvironmcnts that cm prcdisposc to discasc. t lowcvcr. 
they rarely applied it in clinical reasoning. Contrary lo what was found in cxpcrt phy\ici;ln\. 
udv;mcctl students’ knowlcdgc ;Ibout cn;ll>ling condition\ \ccms not yet to hc intcgr;ncd into 
their ocher knowlcdgc about discascs. 
Introduction 
The dcvclopmcnt of medical knowlcdgc cxtcnds over many, many years. It might bc 
supposed that very young children Icarn from their parents a kind of folk knowledge 
about health and illness, prevention and treatment. For instance, they learn about fevers. 
running noses, colds, and pain. They get to know their parents’ reactions to them: if you 
have a fever, you have to stay in bed or at least inside the house; if your nose is running. 
they constantly wipe it or tell you to blow your nose; if you have a cold. you have to 
dress warmly: if you have pain somewhcrc because you fell, they give you a band aid 
and a kiss for consolation. Children also gather ideas about the seriousness of different 
health problems: in some cases you will see a doctor. who will examine you and give 
you pills or a shot. Later during life, children learn about different classes of diseases: 
infectious diseases, i.e., diseases that affect the whole class in school. such as the ‘flu. 
chicken pox, measles, mumps, scarlet fever, or rubella; they learn about different types 
of inflammations. e.g.. of the throat or the car; about traumata, like black eyes, bruises, 
broken legs or burns, etc. Most of these concepts are learned informally, and to a great 
Adtlrcss for corrcspondencc: Dr H. P. A. Bosh&en. Univcr\i~) of Limhurg. Dcpartmcnt of Educational 
Kecarch and Dcvclopmcnt. P.O. Box 616, A3MJ MD hlaasrrichr. l’hc Ncthcrl;md\. 
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extent from experience. Formal teaching of concepts relating to health and illness in 
Dutch elementary schools is done in three contexts: hygiene (how to prevent disease), 
first aid (how to act in case of an accident) and biology (parts and structure of the body). 
In secondary school. the emphasis is on formal biology and health promotion. In the 
meantime, experience with diseases, their own or those of other people, also increases. 
Hence, by the time students enter medical school’, they have acquired a large amount 
of experiential. informal, sometimes even folk knowledge about diseases; most of them’ 
also have a great deal of formal knowledge about the anatomy and physiology of the 
body, including cell biology. Medical students build on this knowledge base. It has to 
be validated, extended and organised in such a way that in the end, it is fit for the 
task of the physician (i.e., diagnosis of a disease and management and treatment of the 
patient), which is done through formal teaching and training and practical experience. 
Medical education, like most curricula for education in the professions, consists of 
two parts: a theoretical and a practical part. During the theoretical part, students should 
acquire the concepts and theories which are supposed to be relevant for professional 
performance. Some of these concepts and theories are considered “the basics” and are 
typically taught prior to the applied, clinical subjects. The basics are supposed to be 
required for understanding the pragmatic relations that are found in everyday practice 
of the profession. For instance, immunology describes and investigates at the organ and 
cell level how the body reacts to an invasion by foreign bodies (e.g., viruses and bacteria). 
It explains, for instance, why on such occasions people are running a temperature or have 
pain at a specific spot. Typically. it is thought that after having acquired the necessary 
knowledge, students must practise that knowledge during a clerkship or an internship, 
or more generally during a period of apprenticeship. Not surprisingly, different kinds 
of teaching and learning take place during these periods from which different learning 
outcomes ensue. Formal teaching emphasises the acquisition of formal-domain concepts 
and theories. These concepts may appear simple to the domain expert. However, for 
the relative novice in a domain, such concepts can be very hard to learn, and hence 
hard to teach, because they are often very complex, involving other, rclatcd complex 
concepts (Carroll, 1964). Consequently, students spend much time elaborating on such 
information and acquiring these concepts. Domain experts who work with thcsc students 
often cannot appreciate the problems and difficulties of this initial learning and can be 
puzzled by the banality of questions students ask, by the superficial understanding of 
the subject matter they are satisfied with, and by the non-discrimination of details of 
key concepts (Moust, 1993); students do not go beyond the information given. However, 
even this piecemeal, but uncomplicated, learning can become very complex when new 
information does not fit the already existing knowledge. This can happen when a student 
has a misconception about a domain concept or model, e.g., due to the application of 
analogies which are too simple. Spiro, Feltovich, Coulson and Anderson (1989), for 
‘In the Netherlands. students typically enter medical school at the age of IX after completion of secondary 
education at the gymnasium or grammar school level. 
2Final examinations in grammar school are taken in seven or eight subjects. including Dutch and at least 
one other modern language as required subjects. Other subjects might be modern languages such as French, 
German, or even Spanish or Russian, the classic languages Greek and/or Latin. mathematics. economics, 
history, history of art. geography and geology. physics. chemistry. biology. through to the creative arts 
and physical education. Universities can require students to have taken exams in a maximum of two other 
subjects. Medical schools require chemistry and physics. not biology. 
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instance, report misconceptions about the bloodstream in elastic blood vessels resulting 
from the analogy of the flow of liquids in inflexible pipes. Misconceptions may also stem 
from deeply entrenched pre-instructional knowledge, such as folk opinions about fever 
or diarrhoea that are inconsistent with scientific findings (Chinn & Brewer, 1993). These 
authors also point out that ontological beliefs and epistemological commitments play a 
role in knowledge revision. Examples of the latter problem are often demonstrated by 
medical students, who seem to believe that theories must be “true” and they sometimes 
resist the idea of having to study competing theories. A typical reaction is “Why should 
we study all those (often sociological or psychological) theories and try to make sense 
out of these as long as the scientists themselves disagree ?” Such an attitude hinders the 
acquisition of a flexible body of knowledge. 
Difficulties like these can arise within one domain, e.g., astronomy (Vosniadou & 
Brewer, 1987) or muscle physiology (Spiro et al., 1989). However, most curricula require 
further learning from their students. They have to integrate knowledge from different 
domains with different paradigms. Existing compartmentalisation must be overcome. For 
instance, in medicine, students must integrate their knowledge about the production and 
destruction of ceils in general, and of red blood cells in particular. with clinical knowlcdgc 
about several kinds of anaemia. In order to reach this integration, students must have a 
good mastery of both (or even more) domains and they must bc able to match concepts 
from one domain with the other, while dealing with loose ends. This is not always 
possible. Some discrepancies are due to the students’ own lack of knowlcdgc; they can 
bc rcmedicd after further study. Other questions arc mystcrics to the domain specialists 
as well. For instance, no physician can tell why a patient with anacmia due to vitamin 
B dcficicncy can also have neurological problems with his/her feet. but not with his/her 
hands. This process of adding, integrating and rcorganising knowlcdgc is an important 
cntcrprisc on the way to complctc mastcry of the domain. According to Rumclhart and 
Norman (197X). formal Icarning consists of cycles of knowlcdgc accretion, restructuring 
and tuning. 
Not only do students acquire conceptual knowlcdgc. they also have to Icarn to USC 
that knowledge in tasks rclcvant to their future profession. In mcdicinc, they must learn 
to take a patient’s history, do a physical examination, and order lilb lcsts in or&r to 
make a diagnosis. These responsibilities require a base of well-organiscd knowlcdgc, 
as well as cognitive, perceptual and psychomotor skills. Physicians must also bc able to 
decide on patient management and treatment, and they need the knowlcdgc and skills to 
communicate to the patient their assessment of the situation and the strategy to be taken. 
Justification and explanation. adapted to the level of comprehension of the patient, play 
an important role in patient compliance. Typically, the knowledge and skills needed for 
these tasks arc not learned through direct teaching, nor are they learned from books, 
but through demonstrations, practical training, and while the students are immersed in 
medical practice during their clerkships or internships (Patrick, 1992). An important 
aspect of at least part of this learning is that it occurs in an implicit way and results in 
tacit knowledge that is hard to verbalise and external& (Rcber. 1989). Jones, Calson 
and Calson (1986) have shown that acquisition of formal knowledge through clinical 
experience was very limited. 
Not only procedural learning, but also perceptual Icarning, is important in mcdicinc. 
A great deal of medical perceptual learning is formaliscd. Students explicitly Icarn to 
differentiate and recognise heart sounds, patterns on ECGs, the structures they feel 
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during physical examination, etc. However, the less obvious, more intricate stimulus 
configurations, especially those involving more than one sensory system, must be often 
picked up from the environment. Examples are the patient with diabetes type 1 with poor 
metabolic control, who is smelling of acetone, or the hypothyroid patient with her or his 
deep grating voice, slow speech and yellowish skin, or the “secret drinker” with liver 
problems who has a specific smell that is often masked by perfumes, mouth rinse or after- 
shave and who has a specific appearance characterised by a yellow shade of the whites 
of the eyes. Linked to conceptual and procedural knowledge. this perceptual learning 
plays an important role in the development of diagnostic and patient management 
proficiency. 
These three processes - conceptual, procedural and perceptual learning - play a role 
in the development of medical expertise. Due to these learning processes, knowledge 
structures develop and change, finally becoming very flexible and well-versed, easily 
applicable in routine and non-routine situations. How these changes occur has to be 
dkscribed and explained. 
Development of Medical Expertise 
When experienced physicians diagnose routine casts. they typically activate their 
most likely hypothcscs in the first minutes of the encounter (Gale & Marsdcn. 1982). 
Often they do this on the basis of the patient’s appcarancc and the complaint. Medical. 
psychological and social information that the doctor knows from earlier contacts with 
the patient may bc used as well (Hobus, Schmidt, Boshuizcn, Zu Patel, 1987). As a next 
step. the doctor tries to cvaluatc these hypothcscs based on information that is gathered 
through history taking, physical examination and lab investigation, if ncccssary. The 
knowlcdgc applied can bc labcllcd “clinical”. If no uncxpcctcd information is obscrvcd, 
this proccdurc can bc complctcd rather quickly. Medical students and incxpcricnccd 
physicians, on the other hand, take more time for hypothesis generation and information 
gathering, and they are less certain about their diagnoses (Custcrs, 1995). Contrary to 
experts, they apply a fair amount of biomedical and other basic science knowlcdgc 
(Boshuizen & Schmidt, 1992). 
During development of medical expertise, knowledge is accumulated and rcstructurcd. 
In our theory, two ways of restructuring are discerned: knowledge encapsulation and 
illness script formation. In the next paragraphs, these processes will be described. 
In the course of their medical training, especially in the first four years of the 
curriculum, students develop rich, elaborated causal networks explaining the causes and 
consequences of disease in terms of general underlying biological or pathophysiological 
processes integrating knowledge from several domains. The result of such network 
construction is that fourth-year students are able to set up lines of reasoning that can 
connect such diverse findings as “%-year old man”. “pain deep in the abdomen and 
perineum”, “the pain is worse while sitting straight than while lying down”, “painful, 
frequent, difficult micturition” and “soft, enlarged prostrate”. In the think-aloud protocol 
of a fourth-year student3 who reasoned about such a case, we find such concepts as 
.‘Thcsc cxamplcs arc taken from two unpublished protocols of II fourth-year student and an cxpcricnced 
family physician who rcusoncd about a case of prostatitis in Q think-aloud cxpcrimcnr. 
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prostrate. location of the organs deep in the abdomen like prostrate and urethra, pressure 
exerted on organs by the gravitational force, enzyme release in infection. and obstruction 
of the urethra by prostrate swelling. Furthermore. the line of reasoning was not at all 
focused on the prostrate exclusively. but many other hypotheses concerning over ten 
other organs were activated during the protocol. 
Elaborate application of biomedical knowledge is seldom found in expert protocols 
(Boshuizen & Schmidt, 1992). For instance, a physician who diagnosed the same case 
referred to an anatomical structure only once. when he said that he expected that the 
median lobe of the prostate would be enlarged (and not the right one as could be 
concluded from the case description). Instead, he used concepts such as urine retention. 
Furthermore, he was very focused on the prostate as the source of the patient’s problems 
and came to a conclusion in far less time than the student. 
These differences between the protocols are a consequence of knowledge restructuring 
that has resulted from extensive and repeated application of knowledge, restructuring 
which has occurred particularly through exposure to patient problems.4 This restructuring 
which has taken place in the course of the development from novice to expert has led to 
abbreviations in the lines of reasoning set up in problem solving. The wealth of detailed 
(patho)physiological and anatomical concepts found in the novice’s protocol diminishes, 
while other types of concepts appear instead, the encapsulating diagnostically relevant 
concepts that more or less summarize the detailed ones. These encapsulating concepts 
subsume entire declarative detailed networks of primarily biomedical concepts. Typically, 
encapsulations arc diagnostically rclcvant concepts of a high level, or simplified causal 
models explaining signs and symptoms. Encapsulations function as a sort of shorthand 
in clinical reasoning processes. For cxamplc, the term “urine retention” is applied by 
experienced physicians to explain several symptoms of a patient: it encapsulates the 
process of a swollen prostate obstructing the urine flow through the urethra which 
goes through the prostrate, leading to rctcntion of the urine in the bladder, and to 
anatomical changes in the wall of the bladder, ;I distcndcd bladder, difficulty with 
micturition, discomfort, and so on. Thcsc cncapsulatcd structures are the results of 
prolonged knowlcdgc application in the context of diagnostic task execution. hence the 
diagnostic rclcvancc of encapsulating concepts. 
In terms of the learning proccsscs dcscribcd cnrlicr in this article. knowlcdgc 
encapsulation is an advanced form of the restructuring phase in a cycle of conceptual 
learning. By its use, dcclarativc knowlcdgc structures bccomc entrenched in dcclarativc 
concepts with a higher Icvcl of cfticicncy and practicality. Encapsulating concepts do not 
ncccssarily have to bc more abstract in the scnsc of being higher in a hierarchy, although 
this might be the cast. For instance. in our view, the concept “mammal” is not so much 
an encapsulation because it subsumes alI the animals which ;ITC members of that class, 
but rather because it cncapsulatcs the knowlcdgc that there arc animals that have a 
body tcmperaturc that is rclativcly indcpcndcnt of the environmental tcmperaturc, that 
have a (more or Icss) furry skin. that do not lay eggs hut have live-born babies that are 
nursed with milk producccl by i\ special gland in the mother. etc. In the same vein. “urine 
rctcntion” is not an encapsulation bccausc it is hierarchically at ;I higher position than 
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the different symptoms it clusters together, but primarily because it summarises a whole 
pathophysiological process leading to those symptoms. 
The reader may have noticed some parallels with Anderson’s (1983, 1987) concept of 
knowledge compilation. We, however, emphasise the conceptual or declarative nature 
of this process of knowledge change. Contrary to Anderson, we do not assume that 
the application of declarative knowledge in problem solving generally leads to a 
transformation into procedural knowledge as a necessary step toward knowledge 
compilation. We propose that knowledge also can be “compiled” in a declarative 
format. Encapsulation can be considered an analogue of compilation. For a more 
detailed discussion of encapsulation, see Schmidt and Boshuizen (1993). 
At the same time, and through exposure to patient problems, an extensive set of 
illness scripts” develops. An illness script is a knowledge structure containing a wealth 
of clinically relevant information about a disease, its consequences (e.g., the complaint a 
patient brings to the doctor, or the signs and symptoms of a disease during the successive 
stages of its course) and enabling conditions, the context in which the illness develops 
(e.g., the physical characteristics of a patient’s environment, his or her age, habits, 
medical history, etc.). These consequences and enabling conditions are linked together 
with relatively little formal knowledge (compared to what experts have learned about 
the subject) about pathophysiological causes (the fault) of symptoms and complaints. 
While solving a problem. a physician searches for an appropriate script and, when he or 
she has sclcctcd one (prostatitis in our example) or a few, he or she will tend to match its 
elcmcnts to the information provided by the patient. hcncc the focused protocol of the 
cxpcrt. In the course of this script-verification process, the script becomes instantiated. 
The illness script that is best instantiated will be favourcd among the possible diagnoses. 
lnstantiatcd scripts, in turn, remain available in memory as episodic traces of previously 
analyzed patients and can bc used in the diagnosis of future similar problems. 
Illness scripts dcvclop around conceptual clusters of knowlcdgc about diseases (more 
or less encapsulated, dcpcnding on the lcvcl of learning) describing the fault at hand. 
These clusters arc linked to fcaturcs of patients, their environment, family, history, 
etc., i.e., the conscquenccs and enabling conditions of the disease. They have emerged 
from continuing cxposurc to patients and arc, thcrcfore, largely the result of extended 
practice. As a conscquencc, they rctlcct the stimulus patterns to which the experts have 
been exposed in their environment. Although the core of these knowledge clusters has 
been learnt through conceptual learning, often by formal teaching, a great deal of the 
learning processes in illness script formation occurs informally, often through perceptual 
Icarning. Examples arc the smell, sound and physical appearance dcscribcd earlier in this 
article. Perceptual learning, however, is not the only factor. Other important processes 
in illness script dcvclopmcnt arc pattern learning (e.g., the alcoholic patient with the 
mental, social and physical risks he or she runs) and fine-tuning of the values a specific 
variable may take in a specific disease. An example of the latter is the lab finding of a 
serum amylase lcvcl of 32 E, which is higher than normal, but is not at all high for the 
cast of acute pancreatitis; it is rather related to chronic pancreatitis. Pattern learning 
and fine tuning can have both pcrccptual and conceptual components. 
‘The terms “illness script” and its constituents “cn;Ming conditions” “fault” and “consequences” have 
been wind by Fclfovich and B;wrows (I9XJ). Contrary to thcsc authors. WC ;Issurnc that illness scripts 
arc srorcd and rctricvcd as such. and are not newly constructed when solving a patient problem. 
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Illness scripts can only develop as a result of conceptual learning and practical 
experience. Due to these processes. illness scripts are enriched with experiential 
knowledge, while the relative amount of formal/causal knowledge decreases. Novices 
in medicine do not have this kind of illness script, although their lay knowledge may 
have a similar structure. 
Since illness scripts develop around clusters of conceptual knowledge, they are part 
of a larger conceptual structure. They appear to be mutually linked, based on elements 
they have in common. For instance, illness scripts may have enabling conditions in 
common (e.g., the diseases associated with smoking), share complaints (e.g.. diseases 
with a cough). involve the same organ system (respiratory diseases), have symptoms in 
common (e.g., cyanosis), or may be based on the same pathophysiology (e.g., diseases 
with left ventricular inflow obstruction). Even very pragmatic links can be found. as is 
suggested by statements such as “In case of an adult with thrush6 you should always think 
of an underlying disease like diabetes, or the patient might have recently undergone some 
treatment with antibiotics.” This link structure is not at all static. Practical experience can 
result in addition to and change in these relations (see Hassebrock & Prietula. 1992). 
Illness scripts seem to exist at various levels of generality, ranging from representations 
of general disease categories such as respiratory disease to representations of individual 
patients seen before, such as the four-year old boy with severe shortness of breath and 
fever with no history of chronic respiratory disease. 
A final aspect of our theory is the assumption that the knowledge structures acquired 
during the different stages of development - pathophysiological networks, encapsulated 
structures, illness scripts and instance scripts- do not decay, nor do they become inert, or 
inaccessible. They sediment into multiple layers which arc acccsscd when ontogenetically 
more recently acquired structures fail in producing an adequate representation of a 
clinical problem (Schmidt, Norman, & Boshuizcn, 1990). 
The central concepts in this theory are knowledge encapsulation and illness script 
formation. Two experiments will be described that provide empirical evidence for these 
processes. 
Experiment 1 
The phenomenon of knowledge encapsulation was first investigated by Schmidt and 
Boshuizen (1993). The general idea was that the initial stages of conceptual learning in 
medical school are characterized by knowledge accretion, leading to an increase in the 
number of concepts that can be applied in medical problem solving. A further increase in 
expertise is, however, associated with encapsulation of concepts in the knowledge base, 
resulting in the subsuming of a great number of detailed biomedical concepts under 
higher level, clinically relevant concepts. Hence, at the lowest levels of expertise, where 
learning is best characterized by knowledge accretion and when no encapsulation has 
yet taken place, reasoning will show an increase in the number of concepts applied with 
increasing expertise. However, an expert’s reasoning will contain less detailed biomedical 
concepts and more encapsulating concepts than the reasoning of a less experienced 
hThrush is an infection in the mouth cspcci;llly found in infants 
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subject at an intermediate level of expertise. This sequence of knowledge accretion 
and encapsulation would hence result in an inverted U-shaped relation between medical 
expertise and the number of concepts applied in the pathophysiological explanation of 
the signs and symptoms in a medical case. This relation was indeed found. The increase 
in the number of encapsulating concepts was also found. The number of detailed concepts 
was not investigated. 
Furthermore. Schmidt and Boshuizen hypothesised that, since experts activate whole 
illness scripts. the relevant encapsulated pathophysiological concepts are also activated at 
once. Students, on the other hand, have to reason through their biomedical knowledge, 
in order to build a model that can explain the patient’s signs and symptoms. The 
concepts applied will be activated one by one. This model building takes time, 
much more time than illness script activation and instantiation. As a consequence, 
reduction of case reading time would seriously affect the student’s explanation, while the 
expert’s performance would hardly suffer. This relation was indeed reported: diagnostic 
accuracy increased with increasing levels of expertise. Furthermore, experts’ diagnostic 
performance and their explanations were not affected by a sizable reduction in processing 
time, whereas the students’ explanations were. However, in this study only one case had 
been used, a case of a disease that had shown remarkable changes in incidence rate over 
the years it had been used in research. both by us and by Pate1 and Groen (1986). Since 
the experiment plays a pivotal role in the confirmation of our theory, there was a need 
to replicate it with different casts. 
This cxpcrimcnt was replicated with two casts. taken from two diffcrcnt specialty areas 
in internal medicine, four lcvcls of expertise, and three reading time conditions. The 
subjects wcrc 96 students and physicians at the University of Limburg: 24 second-year, 
24 fourth-year and 24 sixth-year medical students and 2-I internists with at lcast four years 
of cxpcricncc in internal medicine. 7 Each group of 24 was randomly subdivided into three 
groups of eight which wcrc assigned to three time constraint conditions. Subjects received 
a small compensation for their participation. 
The materials consisted of two booklets. each containing a description of iI clinical GISC 
and two blank response sheets. Each clinical case description reported some contextual 
information and the complaint, the case history, the physical examination, the relevant 
laboratory data and some additional findings. The case descriptions were about half 
a page in Icngth. The two clinical cases. phcochromocytoma and liver cirrhosis, wcrc 
based on actual patients and were prescntcd as iI narrative. An example of such a case 
description can be found in Appendix 1. 
Subjects were asked to produce a diagnosis and explain the pathophysiological process 
underlying the cast. Depending on the experimental condition, subjects were given the 
opportunity to read each GISC for 3 minutes (3’00”). I minute and 1.5 seconds (1’1.5”). 
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or 30 seconds (30”). Subjects were free to use as much time as they needed for the 
assignments. The order of case presentation was balanced. 
Diagnoses were scored on a scale ranging from 0 (incorrect diagnosis) to 6 (completely 
correct diagnosis) for each case. The pathophysiological explanations were schematised 
as semantic networks. The total number of concepts in these schematised explanations 
was counted. For each case, an ideal explanation was constructed (see Appendix 
2). This explanation contained the minimal set of pathophysiologically and clinically 
relevant concepts necessary to explain the signs and symptoms in the case. The subjects’ 
explanations were matched against he ideal explanations: the number of concepts in the 
explanation which were identical or equivalent to concepts in the ideal explanation was 
counted (termed “model concepts”), as was the number of explanation concepts that 
were at a more detailed level. These three measures, in isolation and in combination, 
reflect knowledge encapsulation. The number of concepts in the pathophysiological 
explanations will first increase and subsequently decrease. The number of model 
concepts will increase while the detailed concepts should decrease. A worked out 
example of this scoring procedure can be found in Appendices C-D. The data were 
analyzed with a 3-factor ANOVA with repeated mensurcmcnts over one factor (case). 
Figure I shows the diagnostic accuracy of the tlit’l’crcnt groups. As in the original 
cspcrimcnt by Schmidt and hshuizcn ( 199.3). diagnostic XClllTKy incrcilscd with 
increasing lcvcls of cxpcrtisc (I:(-?. S4)=37. 15 I. p=O.O(Hll). Again, rtxtiing time constraints 
Ililtl 110 signilkilnt CIl’CCtS 011 this IIlCilSlIrC (I*‘( 2, S-l)= I .560. p=O.216). 
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Case Explanation 
As shown by Figures 2-4. case explanation varied with level of expertise. Figure 2 
shows the number of concepts used in the pathophysiological explanations. Like in the 
original study, the total number of concepts had an inverted U-shaped relationship with 
level of expertise (F(3. 84)=8.61. p=O.OOOl). Furthermore, Figure 3 reveals that the 
number of model concepts applied in the case explanations increased monotonically 
with expertise level (F(3, 84)=19.37, p=O.OOOl), while the number of more detailed 
biomedical concepts applied had an inverted U-shaped relation with expertise level (F(3, 
84)=3.87, p=O.O12): advanced students used more detailed concepts than experts and 
junior students (Figure 4). These three findings confirm the knowledge encapsulation 
hypothesis: after a stage of knowledge accretion, further development is characterized 
by the encapsulation of biomedical knowledge, leading to an increase in higher level 
concepts and a decrease in detailed biomedical concepts in clinical reasoning. 
The results of the constraint on reading time were, however, not so clear. Subjects 
at lower and intermediate levels of expertise development would be susceptible to this 
manipulation, but at a more advanced stage, knowledge encapsulation and illness script 
formation would lcad to a relative insensitivity. As expected, there was an effect of 
reading time constraint on the number of concepts used: the more tirnc available for 
studying the casts, the more extensive the explanation was (F(2, g-1)=3.623; p=O.O31). 
Howcvcr. Figure 2 shows that this was irrcspcctivc of cxpcrtisc Itvcl: no interaction 
cffcct was found (F(6, 84)=1.020; p=O.4179). In the original Schmiclt and Boshuizen 
(1993) study, the cxtcnt of the explanations gcncratcd by the second- and fourth-year 
students was heavily affcctcd by time constraint, while the explanations of the other 
groups wcrc unaffcctcd. Comparisons per cxpcrtisc lcvcl in the prcscnt experiment 
rcvcalcd that none of the simple cffccts showed a signilicant diffcrcncc. The group 
of fourth-year students came closest (F(2, 21)=2.6X; p=O.O950). but all other p-values 
14 - 
13 - 
12 - 
11 - 
10 - 
9- 
a- 
7 
second yr fCl”ct;l yr sixlh yr 
expertise level 
Figure 2. Elahoratcncss of ths explanation given by suhjccts of four Jiffcrcnt Icvcl~ of mcdic;tl cxpcrtisc 
of ;I GM studied under three diffcrcnt titnc conditions. 
KSOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT AND RESTRUCI-URING 279 
were >O.lO. This might at best indicate a trend in the direction expected, however, not 
a very strong one. 
Figure 3 shows that the amount of processing time allowed also had a significant 
effect on the number of model concepts (F(2. 84)=9.77, p=O.OOOl), which was also 
the case in the original experiment. No interaction effect was found (F(6. 84)=1.139; 
p=O.2577). Planned comparisons per expertise level were all significant (p~O.05). except 
for the expert group (F(-, 7 21)=2.473. p=O. 1085). Time constraint had no effect on the 
number of detailed concepts applied (main: F(2, 84)=0.300; p=O.7414; interaction: F(6. 
83)=0.254; p=O.9561) (see Figure 4). 
number of model concepts 
11 1 I 
This combination of results complicates the asscssmc~~t of the contirm;ttion level of 
the knowledge encapsulation hypothesis. The overall effects of level of cxpcrtisc on 
the number of concepts, number of model concepts, and numhcr of dctailctl concepts 
applied unambiguously confirm the hypothesis. Howcvcr, the cffccts of reading time 
manipulations are not so clear, as far as the number of concepts applied in the 
explanations arc concerned; they show only a trend in the direction expcctcd. The 
number of model concepts replicates the original tindings. So far, it is difficult to 
decide on the importance of these outcomes. Not only is the theory rather new, but 
so are the procedures applied to investigate it. No further research is available with 
which to compare the present outcomes. The outcomes of the present and original 
cxpcriments arc summarised in Table 1. 
Differences in difficulty between the two cases in this experiment and also in 
comparison to the cndocarditis case originally used. may have played a role in thcsc 
outcomes. The liver cirrhosis case seemed casicst. Diagnosis scores were better for the 
liver cirrhosis cast than for the pheochromocytoma cast (F( 1, 84)=39.116; p=O.OOOl), 
though this was not the same with the experts (interaction f(3, X4)=8.450; p=O.OOOl). 
The endocarditis cast may have been even more diffcult, especially for the second- and 
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Fipurc 4. Number of dctailcd. biomedical concepts in the explanation piwn by subjects of four different 
lcvclb of medical cxpertisc of a case studied under three different time conditions. 
Table 1 
Comparison of the rcwlts of Expcrimcn~ I and ~hr oukxwncs by Schmidt and Boshuizcn (IYY3) 
Dcpcndcnt wriablc used 
Expcrinicm No. of conccp~s 
Schmidt and Boshuizcn (IWZ) 
Expertise fnvcrted U-shaped 
Time YCS 
Intcractiorl Yes 
Expcrimcrir 1 
Expcrtisc lnvcrwtl 1J-dwpcd 
Time YCS 
Interaction No 
No. of model concepts No. of dctailcd concepts 
Linear incrc;w NOI invcstigxtcd 
YC\ Not invcstig;ltcd 
No Not invcstig;~rcd 
Liner ilicrcasc Invcrrcd U-sh;lpctl 
YC\ No 
NO No 
fourth-year medicill SIU&M~S; e.g., RIO sccond-ycitr students and only a few fourth-year 
students had recogniscd iIt Icast one important aspect of the diagnosis, but students in 
the present study could do that. This phenomenon could explain why students arc not 
so susceptible to time constraint manipulations as in the original experiment. but it does 
not clarify why experts also seem only slightly affected by differences in reading time. 
Expcrimcnt 2 
In the introduction of this paper it wils conjectured that illness scripts develop 
around conceptual clusters of knowledge about diseases (more or less cncapsulatcd 
depending on the lcvcl of learning) describing the fault at hand. and that illness script 
dcvelopmcnt is primarily affcctcd by practical cxpcricnces with patients in a diagnostic 
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and/or therapeutic setting. We have also assumed that illness script formation and 
knowledge encapsulation are simultaneous processes. Probably. the driving force for 
encapsulation is active application of causal knowledge in diagnostic and therapeutic 
problems. while experience with real patients feeds illness script formation. enrichment 
and tuning. During the first years of a medical curriculum. such practical experiences 
are rare, although the newer approaches to medical teaching use realistic simulations as 
soon and as often as possible. Hence, the development of rich, experientially grounded 
illness scripts cannot be expected before the clerkships. In particular. this will be the 
case for the enabling conditions of the illness script which receive less attention in the 
handbooks than the consequences of a disease. Experiment 2 addresses the hypothesis 
that experts have illness scripts that are superior regarding enabling conditions.8 
Method 
The method applied was derived from Hobus. Boshuizen and Schmidt (1990). who 
investigated the structure of illness scripts by asking subjects to describe prototypical 
patients with a spccitic disease (cf. Abelson. 1081). Description of a prototypical patient 
entails, howcvcr, ;I methodological problem. It might intlucc the subjects to product 
relatively more patient description statements. thus affecting less expericnccd subjects 
in a diffcrcnt way than cxpcrts who have SCCII more patients. Thcrcforc. a more neutral 
probe was also applied. i.c.. half of the subjects wcrc asked to dcscrihc the clinical 
picture of a specific diSCilSC. 
The subjects wcrc 22 fourth-year students. 22 sixth-year students, 7.7 pcoplc who 
had recently graduated from medical school and wcrc training to bc family physicians 
(interns). and 22 cxpcricnccd family physicians. Subjects wcrc asked either to dcscribc 
prototypical patients with ;I specific discasc, or to dcscribc the clinical pictures of those 
discascs. The discasc names wcrc taken from the GISCS used in WI cnrlicr cspcrimcnt. 
The descriptions wcrc divided into scparatc idea units th:tl wcrc classified as cithcr 
enabling conditions (when rcfcrring to fcaturcs and circumstances of the patient. and 
his or her medical and non-medical history), faults (when rcfcrring to pathophysiol[)giciII 
processes ilSSOCiiltCd with the discasc) or conscqucnccs (when rcfcrring to signs and 
symptoms displayed). About h.S’%, of the idea units. prcclominantly referring to patient 
management and trcatmcnt, could not bc assigned to any of thcsc classes. 
Figure 5 describes the proportion of enabling conditions in the descriptions of 
prototypical patients or clinical pictures given by subjects of diffcrcnt levels of cxpcrtisc. 
Analysis revealed that the proportion of idea units reported rcfcrring to enabling 
conditions incrcascd with increasing Icvcls of expertise (F(?, X1)=9.157: p<O.OOl), 
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Figure 5. Proportion of etxlhling conditions idea units in the descriptions of prototypical patients and clinical 
pictures. 
suggesting illness script enrichment. The kind of probe also affected the proportion 
of enabling conditions idea units mentioned (F (1, 81)=37.692. p<O.OOl). Subjects 
who described prototypical patients mentioned more idea units than subjects describing 
clinical pictures. Furthcrmorc, an interaction between probe and expertise level was 
found (F (3, 81)=3.549; p<O.O5): especially for intcrmediatcs who produced far more 
enabling conditions when asked to describe a prototypical patient than when asked to 
describe the clinical picture of the disease. This suggests that the intermediates have this 
kind of knowledge, but that it is not yet fully integrated into their illness scripts. 
0 I I I 
iourth yr skth yr Iniems fam. phys. 
expertise level 
Figure h. Proportion of f&f idea units in the descriptions of prototypical patients and clinical pictures. 
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Fault 
Figure 6 shows the proportion of fault statements that decreased monotonically (F(3, 
81)=16.137; ~~0.001) with increasing expertise levels. No effects (neither main nor 
interaction) of the kind of probe applied could be found. Regardless of whether subjects 
described the clinical picture of a disease or the prototypical patient having that disease. 
the proportion of Fault statements remained the same in their narratives. 
Conseqliences 
Differences between the proportions of consequences reported by the different 
expertise groups are surprisingly small (Figure 7). The means vary only between 
65.1% for the interns and 67% for the sixth-year students. However, it was again 
found that the kind of probe applied affected the relative number of consequences 
mentioned (F( 1, 81)=4.764, p<O.O5). Subjects who described clinical pictures reported 
relatively more consequences than the others. The interaction between expertise and kind 
of probe was significant (F(3, 81)=2.71 I; ~~0.05); physicians and fourth-year students 
were not affected by probe differences, while sixth-year students and interns were. 
Thcsc results are remarkable in more than one way. First, the steady dccrcasc of 
fault elcmcnts in the descriptions. not affected by the kind of probe applied, is a 
further confirmation of the hypothesis of knowlcdgc encapsulation. This more or less 
cncapsulatcd hiomcdical knowlcdgc connects the other clcmcnts in the illness script. 
An cxamplc, taken from the description of a clinical picture of Hcrpcs Zostcr given by 
a fourth-year student, c;ln illustrate this: 
II’S the chicken pox virus. you’ve had chicken pm in your youth. and the virus wttlcs down in 
your ncrvcs. and you get vcsiclcb on your bkin. nnd thcsc arc wry contagious, bccuusc the fluid 
cont:tins the virus , NN.I you’ll nwcr get rid of it; and it can GIUSC nn infection of the cycs. and 
that might bc wry J;mgcrou\. 
proportion Consequences 
0.8 
;I: 9 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2- 
lourth yr sixlh yr interns tam. phys. 
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Figure 7. Proportion of conscqucnccs ida units in rhc descriptions of prototypical patients and clinical 
picturcx. 
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Experts do not refer to the fault in such an elaborate way. but use concepts such a: 
“virus”. “(skin)nerve(scgment)“. and ‘-weak constitution” that serve the same purpose. 
The results also show that subjects who are requested to describe a clinical picture are 
more apt to volunteer relatively (and absolutely) more consequences. while subjects whc 
describe prototypical patients generate more enabling conditions. This was especially the 
case for the interns and - to a lesser extent - for sixth-year students. Physicians and 
fourth-year students were hardly affected by the differences in probes applied. This 
finding was not expected. Remember that we added a second probe. because the family 
physicians’ longer experience might be retlected in a relatively and absolutely higher 
number of enabling conditions in the prototype descriptions. Apparently. the interns 
who are training as family physicians have already gathered a great deal of information 
about characteristics of patients. their environments and/or medical and psychosocial 
backgrounds. However. this information is only brought forward when they are quite 
explicitly asked for it. indicating that it is not yet part of an illness script that is activated 
as a whole. On the other hand, information retrieval in the students’ and medical experts’ 
knowledge bases is obviously quite insensitive to the kind of probe applied. This might 
indicate that they starch only one kmnvlcdge base irrespective of the question asked: 
the students search their causal networks. the family physicians their illness scripts. The 
other groups might starch one of at Icast INV, not fully intcgratcrl. knowlcdgc structures 
dcpcndcnt on the exact wording of the question. 
Gcncral Discussion 
Expcrimcnt I Iargcly rcplicatcd the results found carlicr \vith another cast (Schmidt 82 
IMhuizcn, 1903). Deviations occurred cspccially in the cffccts of reading time constraint 
on the total number of concepts applied in the C;I\C explanation. Whiic in the original 
study, sccontl- and fourth-year students wcrc cstrcnicly susccptiblc to this nl;IIliptllirti0n 
and cxpcrts wcrc dcfirlitcly not. in Expcrimcnt I. 0111~ the fourth-year stt~dcnts showctl 
;I slight tcnclcncy in this direction. Deviations from carlicr results might bc attributed to 
discrcpancics in case difficulty for the tliffcrcnt cspcrtisc groups. The cliscnscs used to 
invcstigatc knowlcdgc encapsulation in Expcrimcnt I and in the original study arc studi 
iit cliffcrcnt moments in the curriculum by the students and show4 cliffcrcnt prolilcs of 
diagnosis scores, number of rnodcl concepts ilfld number of dctailcd concepts ilpplicd. 
This suggests that knowlcdgc cncapsuli~tio~~ is, in the first place, ;I result of rcpcatcd 
knowlcdgc iIppliCiltiOI1 in the CoIltcXt Of il JiiIgnOStic t:Isk - Of practical cspcricncc. 
HiIving seen one or iI l’cw GISCS is not sufticicnt. This conclusion W;IS further confirmed 
by Expcrimcrlt 7. 
The role of practical cxpcricncc in illness script formation is cvcn more conspicuous. 
Espcrimcnt 9 show4 an incrcasc in the number of enabling conditions mcntioncd 
corresponding with the number of patients students had SCCII and with the number of 
years of cxpcricnce. Seeing patients in it health cart scttin, (1 results in the ilcc{llisition of 
knowlcdgc about the characteristics of those who arc cspcciirlly susccptiblc for spccitic 
discascs. Hobus CI NI. (19S7) have shown that this kind of kno\vLclgc is :I key instrument 
in the activation of ;~n appropriotc set of hypothcscs about what iI specific patient might 
have. Thcsc authors illso found that rcccnt graduates from medical schools arc not able 
to hcncfit from this kind of information, \vhcn it is a\~ailablc. Espcrimcnt 1 suggests that 
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this inability does not result from a lack of knowledge. On the contrary. when sixth-vear 
students and interns are asked to “describe as detailed as possible the prototypical 
patient having . . . (Herpes Zoster. for instance)“. they are in no way inferior to the 
cxpcrienced family physicians (either in the number of enabling conditions mentioned. 
or in the quality). Yet, when asked to “describe as detailed as possible the clinical picture 
of Herpes Zostcr”. their attention shifts toward the consequences of that disorder. 
Apparently. the enabling conditions knowledge is quickly acquired. but the integration 
into other knowledge leading to stable illness scripts that can bc easily activated. even 
in information-limited situations very early in a doctor patient encounter, requires more 
and longer experience. Accessibility of illness scripts is not a major issue in our theory. 
although some research has been done on it (see Hobus, 1991). revealing that physicians 
learn to use some kinds of enabling condition earlier than others. For instance. the role 
of sex. age, smoking and alcohol abuse is easily acknowledged, while drug therapy 
and previous operations, especially in combination with other enabling conditions. arc 
learned later in a career as important factors. The outcomes reported here suggest hat 
more attention to this question might be fruitful. 
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Appendix 1 
Liver Cirrhosis Case Applied in Experimenr I 
A 45year old lawyer complains about a nagging pain in the upper abdomen he has 
been suffering from for some months. Hc attributes this pain to stress due to a decline 
in his clicntclc and his divorce two years ago. HC pays occasional visits to a prostitute, 
but the last time. hc appcarcd impotent. He admits substantial alcohol consumption 
and smoking a lot (40 cigarettes/day). Thcrc is no cvidcnt food intolcrancc. 
Physical examination revcalcd a somewhat cxtcndcd abdomen. but no shifting dullness. 
The liver can bc palpated. and has an irregular surface; the spleen cannot bc palpated. At 
the ankles a littlc cdcma is found. The tcstcs arc rather small. The thorax shows a spider 
IlilCVUS. 
Laboratory tests showed a ESK of 44 mm/h (normal: <I2 mm/h) and a hemoglobin 
level of 8.0 mmol/l (normal: 8.5-11.0 mmol/l). Sodium I38 mmol/l (normal: 132-142 
mmol/l). potassium 3.6 mmol/l (normal: 3.6-i-5.0 mmol/l), ALT (SGPT) I20 U/I (normal: 
<40), AST (SGOT) 84 U/I (normal: ~40 U/l), LDH (LD) 800 U/I (normal: 200-450 U/I), 
GTT 250 U/I (normal: 60 U/I), alkaline phosphatase 200 U/I (normal: 30-125 U/I) and 
bilirubin 25 pmcwl/l (normal: <I7 kmcwl/l). 
Appendix 2 
The ideal explanation is represented as a network; rectangular frames contain 
explanatory concepts, frames with rounded corners represent case elements. Most 
links bctwcen concepts arc directed (indicated by an arrow). referring to causal, 
conditional and attribute relations. Identity relations are non-directed. Some links arc 
labcllcd “cond/ncg”, indicating that this specific finding contradicts the other concept. 
Arrows within a frame refer to increase or decrease. 
bi
hb
in
 
288 H. P. A. BOSHUIZEN cr af. 
Appendix 3 
Scoring of an explanation of the liver cirrhosis case 
Student Explanation 
Due to stress he smokes and drinks a lot. This has resulted in a fatty liver, and hence 
pressure on the supplying veins. Then blood cannot stream fast through the liver and 
gets stuck before the liver. causing portal hypertension. This results in excretion of liver 
fluids from the lymph capsula. leading to ascites and an extended abdomen. 
stress 
P (Gig-) 
before the liver 
Frame and link CO~CS ;Irc similar to those in the idcal explanation, Appendix 2 
This semantic network has been projcctcd on the idcal explanation (see Appendix 
4). Identical concepts arc stress, smoking, drinking (a lot), prcssurc on the supplying 
veins, portal hypcrtcnsion, ascites and cxtcndcd abdomen. This results in six model 
concepts. 
Fatty liver. blood cannot stream fast through the liver. blood gets stuck before the 
liver. cxcrction of liver fluids from the lymph capsula arc more dctailcd concepts used 
to explain the relation bctwccn some of the model concepts. This results in four dctailcd 
concepts. 
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